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Bundling of non-complementary products as a competitive strategy 
 
 
Abstract 
  This paper discusses three questions about bundling. The first question is about the 
incentive of bundling for multiproduct firms in a symmetric duopoly market under 
consumers’ product specific preference. We show that mixed bundling is the dominant 
strategy when consumers’ reservation value is relatively low; otherwise, firms choose 
independent pricing. The second question is about the effect of bundling to deter entry 
under consumers’ product specific preference. When consumers’ reservation value is 
relatively high, we show that the incumbent has an incentive to use bundling to deter 
entry only if a prior commitment is applicable. However, when consumers’ 
reservation value is low, the multiproduct firm even has no incentive to use bundling 
and bundling has no effect on entry deterrence. The third question is about the entry 
deterrence effect of bundling under consumers’ firm specific preference. we show that 
the incumbent can deter and even block entry by bundling when consumers’ 
reservation value is at an intermediate or relatively high level. This result holds even 
when the incumbent cannot commit itself to such bundling in advance. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
  
  As the whole economy all over the world develops rapidly, the categories of items 
sold are increasing as well. A result of this products variety is that we can see many 
products sold together. They may be in a box, such as several different cosmetic items in 
a single box. This kind of selling way is called “pure bundling”. Pure bundling is 
defined as that products are sold in a certain proportion. Besides pure bundling, you 
may also find that buying several items together is more profitable, such as a hamburger 
set with a glass of cola may be cheaper than the sum of the price for each one. This kind 
of selling way is called “mixed bundling”. Mixed bundling represents that if you 
purchase several products together, you will get a certain amount of discount. Bundling 
can be observed in many industries, such as telecommunication, financial, cosmetic 
industries and so on.  
  Usually people think that bundling is a way of price discrimination, which is used as 
a selling strategy. However, bundling, especially pure bundling is always suspected as a 
tool for entry deterrence or market foreclosure. For example, Japan Fair Trade 
Commission once suggested to cease the bundling of Microsoft’s Word and Excel, since 
it may be a tool to foreclose the word processor market where another competitor 
Ichitaro existed. Therefore, surrounding the topic of bundling from the perspectives of 
price discrimination and entry deterrence, the previous work on bundling can be divided 
into these two types. One type is about bundling as a price discrimination. Many 
researches can tell us why this is worthy discussing. In a monopoly market, Matutes and 
Regibeau (1988), Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Adams and Yellen (1976) showed 
important models. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) showed that in a monopoly market, the 
multiproduct firm has a stronger incentive to cut price if it engages in a pure bundle, 
compared with the situation under independent pricing. Moreover, consumers have 
more varieties to choose under independent pricing. These lead that independent pricing 
is more profitable than pure bundling. Matutes and Regibeau (1992) showed that mixed 
bundling is more profitable than independent pricing because the demand under mixed 
bundling is bigger than it under independent pricing, for the more purchasing varieties 
under mixed bundling. These results are based on a certain level of consumers’ 
reservation price. Adams and Yellen (1976) showed that pure bundling may dominate 
independent pricing in some occasions after numerous experiments with random 
distributions of reservation value. In a competitive market, Matutes and Regibeau 
(1988), Matutes and Regibeau (1992) and Gans and King (2005) showed that 
bundling harms firms’ profits if both bundles, because bundling intensifies the 
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competition. This leads to a price competition. However, if either bundles, mostly 
bundles attracts more consumers, therefore the one bundles gets more profit. For these, 
in order to release the competition, independent pricing is always preferred. The other 
type of previous work is about bundling as a entry deterrence tool. Whinston (1990), 
Nalebuff ( 2004), Peitz (2008), Armstrong, M., and Vickers, J. (2010) discussed this 
question. Mostly these results showed that bundling can deter entry for the leverage 
effect from the monopoly market to the potential competitive market. And most 
previous researches discuss pure bundling rather than mixed bundling, since pure 
bundling is more likely to deter entry hence its legality is also considered.  
  From the previous work, we find that many previous researches assumed that 
products are complementary such as cameras and lenses. These products must be used 
together, therefore in the model a single product demand does not exist. However, in 
reality, bundles of non-complementary products, such as the bundle of Microsoft’s Word 
and Excel, are very common. Consumers may prefer buying only a single product 
because it can be used alone or it can be paired with other products. Therefore it is 
necessary to talk about bu ndling based on non-complementary products. In this paper, 
we intend to discuss the two types of bundling problem. In addition, we find that 
Hotteling model is used very often on bundling problem. And Hoettling model can be 
divided into two types: consumers’ product specific preference and firm specific 
preference. Product specific preference means that consumers consider products are 
different, such as a consumer may prefer Gucci’s bag but Prada’s clothes. 
Comparatively, firm specific preference means that consumers only consider the firms 
are different. For example, the transportation cost does not increase in proportion to the 
number of the items you buy from a certain supermarket. We intend to use Hotteling 
model in this paper.  
  In a summary, we discuss three questions of bundling based on the assumption of 
non-complementary products: first, we talk about bundling for price discrimination 
under consumers’ product specific preference. Second, we discuss bundling for entry 
deterrence under consumers’ product specific preference. Finally, we take a look at 
bundling for entry deterrence but under consumers’ firm specific preference. There is a 
lack of the extension of Matutes and Regibeau (1988)’ model on our first and second 
topic, we extend their model in this paper. And we build a new model to discuss the 
final topic. 
  The reminder of this paper is as follows. In chapter 2, we discuss bundling for price 
discrimination and product specific preference. In chapter 3, we see bundling for entry 
deterrence and product specific preference. In chapter 4, we talk about bundling for 
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entry deterrence and firm specific preference. In chapter 5, we show a summary.  
 
Chapter 2. Bundling for price discrimination and product specific preference 
 
2-1. Introduction 
 
  By considering bundling as a selling strategy, a multiproduct firm can sell its products 
in three ways: pure bundling, independent pricing, and mixed bundling. Pure bundling 
refers to selling products only in a bundle. independent pricing means selling products 
separately. Mixed bundling means selling goods by using both of these pricing methods. 
In this study, assuming the market is a duopoly and each firm sells the same products, 
we examine the incentives of firms to engage in bundling. We analyze this topic by 
assuming the products that a firm sells are non-complementary. In addition, we assume 
a firm can select among three strategies: pure bundling, independent pricing, and mixed 
bundling. 
  This question has been examined rather extensively in the relevant literature by 
assuming the products involved are complementary. Accordingly, previous literature 
assumed consumers are not allowed to purchase only a single product. For example, in 
previous studies, two products are complementary—for instance, like a computer and a 
mouse or a camera and a lens; the products must be used together because one product 
cannot be used without the other. Therefore, a consumer must also purchase the 
products together. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) examined firms’ incentive to engage in 
pure bundling and independent pricing in a duopoly market. In their model, they 
assumed there were two firms, A and B, selling two complementary system components, 
say, products 1 and 2. A consumer purchases at most one unit of each product. Therefore, 
when both firms engage in independent pricing, consumers have five options to select 
from, namely, AA, BB, BA, AB, and purchasing nothing. For example, AA means buying 
two components together from firm A, whereas AB means buying product 1 from firm A 
and product 2 from firm B. When both firms bundle, consumers have three purchasing 
options to select from, namely, AA, BB, and purchasing nothing. When only firm A 
bundles, because consumers must buy two components, the situation is the same as the 
one where both firms bundle. The researchers showed that independent pricing always 
dominated pure bundling.  
  In this study, we assume products are non-complementary—for example, like coffee 
and sugar. We can find a bundle of coffee and sugar in supermarket stores. However, 
coffee and sugar are also sold separately. A consumer may purchase only coffee because 
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he prefers drinking coffee without sugar. A consumer may also buy the bundle for a 
lower price. Therefore, consumers are allowed to purchase only a single product in this 
situation. Based on the setup of Matutes and Regibeau (1988), with the new assumption 
that products are non-complementary, when both firms engage in independent pricing, 
there are nine purchasing options: AA, BB, A1, A2, B1, B2, AB, BA, and purchasing 
nothing. When only firm A bundles, consumers have AA, BB, B1, B2, and purchasing 
nothing to select from, which is not equal to the situation where both choose to bundle. 
In our study, we find that pure bundling may dominate independent pricing. 
  Matutes and Regibeau (1992) subsequently examined the incentives for mixed 
bundling and independent pricing for multiproduct firms in a duopoly market. Using a 
model similar to the one from 1988, they found a variety of results corresponding to the 
level of consumers’ reservation value (C). When C is small, the equilibrium result is that 
both firms engage in mixed bundling. However, this situation turns out to be a 
prisoners’ dilemma. When C is big, the equilibrium result is that both firms engage in 
independent pricing. If C is in between, the equilibrium result is that either firm chooses 
mixed bundling. Gans and King (2006) extended the model of Matutes and Regibeau 
(1992) for analyzing the incentives for mixed bundling and independent pricing. They 
found the same results, but they changed the model from two to four firms. Thus, the 
situation became a problem concerning integration as well.  
  No study has considered the relationship between pure bundling and mixed bundling 
based on complementary products. This is because when pure bundling and mixed 
bundling are considered in this setup, if one firm engages in pure bundling, it 
automatically means that the other firm has to engage in pure bundling as well. Matutes 
and Regibeau (1988) found that pure bundling was always dominated by independent 
pricing, and hence, there is no need to compare pure bundling and mixed bundling. 
However, in this study, we find that pure bundling may dominate as a selling strategy 
over independent pricing, and hence, we must compare mixed bundling with pure 
bundling.  
  By adding the possibility of consuming one product, Peitz (2008) analyzed the entry 
deterrence effect of pure bundling for a multiproduct monopoly in a two dimensional 
Hotelling model. This is not a symmetric market. In his model, consumers are allowed 
to buy a bundle from the incumbent in addition of another product from the rival if the 
entry has occurred. Based on this assumption, pure bundling is preferred by the 
incumbent if the entry has happened. This differs from the result of Whinston(1990) 
where bundling is never preferred if the entry has occurred. In Peitz (2008)’s model, the 
horizontal axis had vertical axis represent consumers’ surplus from buying product 1 
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and 2, respectively. A consumer located further from a firm means that this consumer 
has higher surplus of buying this firm’s product hence she is more willing to buy its 
product. However, in our model, a consumer located further from a firm means that she 
needs to pay more cost to buy the firm’s product, therefore she is less willing to buy its 
product. Based on Peitz (2008)’s model, the market configuration does not change as 
consumers’ reservation changes. Nalebuff (2004) also considered the similar problem by 
assuming the incumbent chooses prices before the entrant in a two dimensional 
Hotelling model similar to our model. But he did not examine the change of the level of 
consumers’ reservation. However in our study, market configurations change as 
consumers’ reservation changes and we assume consumers buy at most of each product.  
  The remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows. In section 2, the model is 
introduced. In section 3, we analyze the equilibrium prices and profits in four cases: (1) 
pure bundling and independent pricing, (2) independent pricing and mixed bundling, (3) 
mixed bundling and pure bundling, and (4) integrating all three strategies. In section 4, 
we show the differences between this study and previous ones. In section 5, we present 
conclusions. 
 
2-2. The model 
 
  Suppose there are two products, products 1 and 2, which can be used together or 
separately, such as coffee and sugar. There are two firms in the market, firms A and B, 
producing both products 1 and 2. Without loss of generality, all marginal costs are set to 
equal zero. A consumer purchases at most one unit of each product. Therefore, if both 
firms engage in independent pricing, nine system configurations are available for 
consumers to purchase, as follows: AA, BB, A1, A2, B1, B2, AB, and BA; otherwise, they 
purchase none. For example, AB means buying product 1 from firm A and product 2 
from firm B and A1 stands for buying only product 1 from firm A. We consider three 
strategies for each firm: pure bundling (B), independent pricing (N) (i.e., non-bundling), 
and mixed bundling (M). However, we analyze four cases in this study. In the first case, 
we consider that firms have pure bundling and independent pricing as the only two 
strategies. In the second case, we set the condition that both firms can select from the 
strategies of mixed bundling and independent pricing only. In the third case, we assume 
the two firms have mixed bundling and pure bundling as their choices of strategy. In the 
last case, we integrate all three cases. 
  In each case, we examine the firms’ choice of pricing schemes by employing a 
two-stage game. In stage one, the firms decide whether to bundle. In stage two, the 
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firms set their prices simultaneously. 
Then, we extend the basic model of Matutes and Regibeau (1988), allowing consumers 
to purchase only one product. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit square: 
firm A is located on the origin (0, 0), while firm B is located at the point of coordinates 
(1, 1). The horizontal axis stands for product 1, and the vertical axis stands for product 2. 
Generally, under an independent-pricing scheme, a consumer buying only one product 
has a surplus of  
 
C - λdmj - pmj, 
 
where m = 1, 2, and j = A, B. The term C is the reservation value common to all 
consumers to buy one product. Therefore, buying two products will result in 2C. The 
term dmj is the distance between the consumer’s location and the firm j horizontally or 
vertically, which depends on the product m. The term pmj is the price of firm j’s product 
m, and λ > 0 measures the degree of horizontal product differentiation. We assume λ = 1 
in this study. A consumer buying two products together has a surplus of  
 
2C - λ(d1i + d2j) - p1i - p2j, 
 
where i, j = A, B. Concerning different pricing schemes, if a consumer buys both 
products from firm i engaging in pure bundling, she will have a surplus of  
 
2C - λ(d1i + d2i) - pi, 
 
where pi stands for the price of pure bundling of firm i. In addition, if a consumer 
purchases two products together from firm i engaging in mixed bundling, she will 
obtain a surplus of  
 
2C - λ(d1i + d2i) - (p1i + p2i - δi), 
 
where δi is a discount owing to mixed bundling.  
 
2-3. Equilibrium prices and profits 
 
  In this section, we find equilibrium results, analyze the behavior of firms in three 
cases, and then integrate these three cases into a final case. In every case, we consider 
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three strategy combinations for analyzing a Nash equilibrium. We draw the market 
configurations of each combination in a two-dimensional Hotelling unit square by using 
consumer surplus formulations. Then, we can calculate the firms’ profits in each 
combination and find out the equilibriums by comparing the profits of each combination. 
We will see that the market configurations and equilibriums are different, depending on 
the level of consumers’ reservation value (C).  
 
2-3-1. Case 1: pure bundling vs. independent pricing 
 
  In this case, we assume firms have only two strategies available: pure bundling (B) 
and independent pricing (N) (i.e., non-bundling). The market configurations 
corresponding to different dimensions of C are presented in Figure 1. The three strategy 
combinations possible are BB, BN (NB), and NN. BB means that both firms engage in 
pure bundling. BN means only one firm engages in pure bundling, and we set the 
condition that firm A is the one that does so. NN is the combination that both firms do 
not bundle goods. Concerning the situation where only firm A bundles, we demonstrate 
an example for the calculation in the situation where C ≤ 0.5. The demand of AA on the 
horizontal and vertical axes are the same, and we denote demand as dmA, m = 1, 2, and 
2C - dmA - pA ≥ 0 (i.e., dmA ≤ 2C - pA). Then, the area of the triangle is (2C - pA)2/2, and 
this is the demand for firm A. Therefore, profit is  
 
πA = pA (2C - pA)2/2. 
 
Maximizing firm A’s profit with respect to pA gives us maximized  
 
pA* = 2C/3 
 
and  
 
πA* = 16C3/27. 
 
For other calculations, please refer to the Appendix 1. 
  We define πhl as the profit of a firm engaging in strategy h, while the rival engages in 
strategy l, with h, l∊{B, N, M,}. The term phl is the price of one product but it is the 
bundle price when h stands for bundle (B). We obtain the equilibriums as follows: first, 
both firms choose independent pricing (NN):  
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When C < 0.5, because πNN = πNB > πBB = πBN, and  
When  0.5 ≤ C < 0.75, because πNN > πNB > πBB > πBN. 
We also have the results on the prices as follows:  
2pNN > pBN = pBB > pNB = pNN, when C < 0.5, and  
2pNN > pBN > pBB > pNB = pNN, when 0.5 < C ≤ 0.75.  
Second, there are two equilibriums where both firms choose independent pricing (NN) 
and both choose pure bundling (BB),  
When  0.75 ≤ C < 1, because πNN > πBB > πNB > πBN,  
When 1 ≤ C < 1.51, because πNN > πBB > πBN > πNB, and  
When  C ≥ 1.5, because πNN > πBB = πNB = πBN.  
Finally, we have the results on the prices as follows:  
2pNB > 2pNN > pBN > pBB > pNB > pNN when 0.75 ≤ C < 1,  
2pNN > 2p NB > pBB > pBN > pNN > pNB when 1 ≤ C < 1.5, and  
pBN= pBB= pNN when C ≥ 1.5. 
 
Market configuration when both firms engage in individual pricing (NN): 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   (C < 1)           (C ≥ 1) 
Market configuration when firm A engages in pure bundling and firm B engages in 
individual pricing (BN): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
1 Strictly speaking, when C approaches 1.4, say C = 1.48, only NN becomes the equilibrium.  
 
AA 
B1 
AA 
B2 BB 
B1 
A1 
 
AA 
A1 
AB B2 BB 
B1 
A2 BA 
AB
AA 
BB 
BA 
B2 BB 
AA 
B2 
BB 
B1 
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 (C ≤ 0.5)                 (0.5 ≤ C < 1)           (1 ≤ C < 1.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      (C ≥ 1.5) 
Market configuration when both engage in pure bundling (BB): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(C < 0.75)            (C ≥ 0.75) 
Figure 1. Market configuration. Case 1: pure bundling vs. individual pricing 
 
  On comparing our results with those of Matutes and Regibeau (1988), we find several 
differences. We find that the market configurations are more complicated in the 
presence of single-product consumption. In our study, we find the result that both firms 
bundle (i.e., BB) may appear in the equilibrium, while independent pricing always 
dominates as a selling strategy over pure bundling (NN) in Matutes and Regibeau 
(1988). When 0.75 < C < 1, the market for BB is an adjacent market. In an adjacent 
market, according to Matutes and Regibeau (1992, p.52, line36), “both firms set prices 
for their complete systems so as to leave consumers located at the common market 
boundary with exactly zero surplus.” The market boundary of AA and just touches that 
of BB. Firms A and B do not compete directly, but all the consumers in the market are 
covered. Comparatively, competition among pure, bundled, and single-product systems 
is fierce in the market for BN. Therefore, we see πBB > πBN and πBB > πNB temporarily.  
 
2-3-2. Case 2: mixed bundling vs. independent pricing 
 
  In this case, we consider a situation where firms have only two choices as their 
strategy: mixed bundling (M) and independent pricing (N). The market configurations 
AA 
BB 
BB 
AA 
AA 
BB 
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are presented in Figure 2. There are three strategy combinations: MM, MN (NM), and 
NN. The term pMhl is the set price of the mixed bundle, and phl is the price of a single 
product. We obtain the following results.  
First, both firms choose mixed bundling (MM)  
When  C ≤ 0.7, because πMM = πMN > πNN = πNM,  
When  0.7 < C < 1, because πMN > πMM > πNM > πNN,  
When  1 ≤ C < 1.2, because πMM > πMN > πNN > πNM, and  
When  1.2 ≤ C < 1.4, because πMN > πNN > πMM > πNM.  
Second, both firms choose not to bundle (NN), when C ≥ 1.4, because πNN > πMN > πNM 
> πMM. 
We also have the results on the prices as follows:  
2pNN > pMMM = pMMN, pMM = pMN > pNM = pNN when C ≤ 0.7,  
2pNN > pMMM ≤ pMMN, pMM > pMN > pNM > pNN when 0.7 < C < 1.1,  
2pNN > pMMM > 2pNM > pMMN, pMM > pMN > pNN > pNM when 1.1 ≤ C < 1.16,  
2pNM > pMMN > pMMM, pMN > pMM > pNM = pNN when 1.16 ≤ C < 1.4, and  
2pNN > pMMN > 2pNM > pMMM, pMN > pMM > pNN > pNM when C ≥ 1.4. 
 
 
 
Market configuration when both firms engage in mixed bundling (MM): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(C < 0.85)        (C ≥ 0.85) 
Market configuration when firm A engages in mixed bundling and firm B engages in 
individual pricing (MN): 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A1 
A2 
AA 
B2 
B1 
B2 BB 
AB 
AA 
BA 
AA 
AB 
BB 
BA 
A1 
AB 
B1 
B1 
BB 
A2 BA 
AA 
AB B2 BB 
B1 
BA 
AB 
BB 
B2 
AA 
BA 
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       (C ≤ 0.7) (0.7 < C < 1.1) (1.1 ≤ C ≤ 1.16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(C ≥ 1.16) 
See figure 1 for the market configurations of “neither firm bundles.”  
Figure 2. Market configuration. Case 2: mixed bundling vs. individual pricing 
 
  Let us examine the differences between our results and that of Matutes and Regibeau 
(1992). We find that when C < 1.2, the equilibrium result is that both firms bundle and it 
is not a prisoners’ dilemma. In comparison, the result is that both firms bundle and that 
it is a prisoners’ dilemma in Matutes and Regibeau (1992). When 1.2 < C < 1.4, the 
equilibrium result is MM but it turns out to be a prisoners’ dilemma. At the same time, 
we find that there is no MN or NM in the equilibrium result, whereas these two results 
appear in Matutes and Regibeau (1992).  
 
2-3-3. Case 3: mixed bundling vs. pure bundling 
 
  In this case, we consider firms that have only two choices of strategy: mixed bundling 
(M) and pure bundling (B). The market configurations are presented in Figure 3. There 
are three strategy combinations: MM, MB (BM), and BB. We obtain the following 
results.  
First, both firms choose mixed bundling (MM),  
When  C < 0.6, because πMM = πMB > πBB = πBM, 
When  0.6 ≤ C < 0.85, because πMB > πMM > πBB > πBM,  
When 0.85 ≤ C < 1, because πMM > πMB > πBB > πBM, and 
When 1 ≤ C < 1.4, because πMM > πBM > πMB > πBB. 
Second, there are two equilibriums: both firms choose mixed bundling (MM) or pure 
bundling (BB), when C ≥ 1.4, because πMM > πBM = πMB = πBB. We also have the 
following results on prices:  
pMMM = pMMB < pBB = pBM, pMM = pMB when C < 0.6, 
pBB < pBM < pMMM < pMMB, pMM < pMB when 0.6 ≤ C < 0.85, 
pBB = pBM = pMMM = pMMB, pMM = pMB when 0.85 ≤ C < 1,  
AB 
BA 
BB 
AA 
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pBM < pBB < pMMB < pMMM, pMB < pMM when 1 ≤ C < 1.16,  
pBM = pBB < pMMB < pMMM, pMB < pMM when 1.16 ≤ C < 1.4, and  
pBM = pBB = pMMB < pMMM when C ≥ 1.4. 
 
 
 
Market configuration when firm A engages in pure bundling and firm B engages in 
mixed bundling (BM): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (C < 0.6)                  (0.6 ≤ C < 0.85)            (0.85 ≤ C < 1.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     (C ≥ 1.4) 
 
See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for the market configurations of “both engage in pure 
bundling” and “both engage in mix-bundling,” respectively. 
Figure 3. Market configuration. Case 3: mixed bundling vs. pure bundling 
 
 
  No study has considered the case where both pure bundling and mixed bundling are 
possible. Based on the assumption of non-complementary products, we are able to 
consider such cases. Furthermore, we find that BB appears in the equilibrium in case 1 
and that MM is the result in case 2 in the same range of C. This requires further work to 
compare pure bundling and mixed bundling, which was not necessary in previous 
studies. Fortunately, we find that mixed bundling always dominates as a selling strategy 
B2 BB 
B1 
AA 
AA AA 
B2 B2 
BB 
BB 
B1 
B1 
AA 
BB 
 13
over pure bundling if C < 1.4. This allows us to integrate all three bundling strategies in 
the following section. We can easily understand that mixed bundling makes the 
competition less fierce and creates more demand than pure bundling. Therefore, mixed 
bundling is a better choice for firms. 
 
2-3-4. The integration of all three cases 
 
  After analyzing all of the possible equilibriums responding to different levels of C in 
the three cases, a question may arise as to the strategy combinations that would appear 
in the equilibrium if both firms have all three strategies to consider: pure bundling, 
independent pricing, and mixed bundling. Hence, we consider all the results in the 
above three cases together to pursue the equilibrium strategy combination. First, in case 
1, we can easily find when C < 1.4, independent pricing (NN) is mostly the dominant 
strategy. However, pure bundling (BB) still appears in the equilibrium. In case 2, mixed 
bundling dominates as a selling strategy over independent pricing. In case 3, mixed 
bundling dominates over pure bundling. Therefore, we can conclude that when C < 1.4, 
mixed bundling is the dominant strategy for both firms. In the dimension of C ≥ 1.4, the 
game is the same as in Matutes and Regibeau (1988 and 1992) and we say that the result 
is the same. Thus, independent pricing is the dominant strategy for both firms. 
 
2-4. Differences compared to previous studies 
 
Table 1 shows the differences between this study and previous studies.  
 
Table 1. Differences compared to previous research 
 Previous studies by 
Matutes and Regibeau (1988 and 
1992) 
The present study 
Assumption Consumers must purchase two 
products together. 
Consumers can buy a single 
product. 
Analysis 
subjects 
Only two cases are analyzed. The 
case where both mixed bundling 
and pure bundling are possible is 
not considered. The BN 
combination is not considered in 
the analysis of pure bundling and 
Three cases are analyzed with two 
strategies for each. The analysis of 
pure bundling and individual 
pricing also has the BN 
combination. 
 14
individual pricing. 
Results 1. In the case of pure bundling 
and individual pricing, the 
equilibrium is always NN. 
2. In the case of mixed bundling 
and individual pricing, when C  
< 1.2, the equilibrium is MM 
and it is a prisoners’ dilemma 
game. When C > 1.3, the 
equilibrium is NN. If C is 
between the former two levels, 
the equilibrium is MN or NM.  
 
1. In the case of pure bundling 
and individual pricing, in 
addition to the equilibrium of 
NN, there is also BB 
corresponding to different C. 
2. In the case of mixed bundling 
and individual pricing, when C 
< 1.4, the equilibrium is MM. 
However, it is not a prisoners’ 
dilemma game when C < 1.2. 
When C ≥ 1.4, the equilibrium 
is NN. 
3. In the case of mixed bundling 
and pure bundling, MM is 
always the dominant strategy. 
4. Finally, when we integrate all 
the three strategies, when C < 
1.4, the equilibrium is that both 
firms engage in mixed 
bundling. When C is equal to or 
more than 1.4, the equilibrium 
is that both firms engage in 
individual pricing. 
 
2-5. Conclusions 
 
  This study presented an extensive model to show the incentives to firms in relation to 
bundling strategies in a duopoly market, based on the assumption that consumers can 
also buy a single product (i.e., we considered non-complementary products). The 
single-product system changes the mechanism and structure of the game compared to 
that in previous research, which leads us to different results. Both firms may choose 
pure bundling if they only consider pure bundling and independent pricing, whereas 
firms always choose independent pricing in Matutes and Regibeau (1988). When 
considering only mixed bundling and independent pricing, both firms choose mixed 
bundling in a certain range of C, but it is not a prisoners’ dilemma game. In contrast, it 
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is a prisoners’ dilemma game in Matutes and Regibeau (1992). Thus, it was necessary to 
consider the case of pure bundling and mixed bundling in our study, which finds no 
place in the framework used in previous studies. Our model enables firms to compete by 
considering pure bundling, mixed bundling, and independent pricing simultaneously. By 
considering bundling, it is closer to the reality that a multiproduct firm can consider all 
the three selling strategies at the same time. 
 
Chapter 3. Bundling for entry deterrence and product specific preference 
 
3-1. Introduction 
 
Suppose a multiproduct incumbent monopolizes one market but faces a potential 
entrant in another market. Whinston (1990) considered such a situation and, using a 
simple Hotelling model, argued that the incumbent could deter entry by bundling but 
only if it makes a prior commitment. Nalebuff (2004) showed that in a modified 
Hotelling model, if the incumbent chooses prices before the entrant, it could deter entry 
by bundling even without any commitment. Peitz (2008) showed that bundling may 
block entry in a two-dimensional Hotelling model. However, there is a lack of research 
on this question by considering consumers’ reservation value.  
In reality, consumers hold different reservation value to different products. A 
consumer’s reservation value is the highest price she is willing to pay. A product may be 
very welcomed thus consumers’ reservation value is very high and consumers are 
willing to pay high price. One example may be Apple Company’s products, saying 
IPhone. When the firm launches a new version of IPhone, consumers rush into the store 
to buy in a high price. At the same time, there are goods that are not popular for 
consumers thus many people do not want to afford. We can say that consumers’ 
reservation value is relatively low in this case. Therefore, it is closer to the reality if we 
consider the entry deterrence problem by considering consumer’s reservation value. In 
opposite to previous work (Whinston 1990; Nalebuff, 2004, Peitz, 2008) where 
deterring entry by bundling (monopoly under bundling) is always more profitable than 
letting the entry occur, we find that when consumer’s reservation value is low, the 
incumbent even has no incentive to use bundling to deter entry. But when consumer’s 
reservation value is relatively high, it is not the case. 
Bundling has attracted significant research attention, and most studies in this field 
consider symmetric competition. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) examined the incentive 
of pure bundling for two symmetric, multiproduct firms by building a two-dimensional 
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Hotelling unit square. They found that pure bundling selling strategies were always 
dominated by independent pricing strategy, regardless of the level of consumers’ 
reservation value. Gans and King (2006) extended Matutes and Regibeau’s (1992) 
model to analyze the incentives associated with mixed bundling. Thanassoulis (2007) 
and Armstrong and Vickers (2010) analyzed the case of mixed bundling in a fully 
served market.  
The remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows. In section 2, the model is 
introduced. In section 3, we analyze equilibriums and results. In section 4, we present 
our conclusion. 
 
3-2. The model 
 
Suppose there are two products, products 1 and 2. Product 1 is only provided by firm 
A, while product 2 may also be provided by firm B. We assume the marginal cost of 
either product for both firms is zero. Firm A has two strategies to select from, that is, 
pure bundling and independent pricing. Consumers purchase at most one unit of each 
product. Therefore, consumers are able to select at most six consumption combinations 
if firm A does not bundle, namely AA, AB, A1, A2, B2, and purchasing nothing. AA 
means buying products 1 and 2 from firm A; AB means buying product 1 from firm A 
and product 2 from firm B; and A1, A2, and B2 mean purchasing only a single product 1 
from firm A, a single product 2 from firm A, and a single product 2 from firm B, 
respectively. A consumer purchasing one product will have a reservation value of C. 
Therefore, a consumer will have 2C if she purchases two products. We engage in a 
three-stage game. At the first stage, firm B decides whether to enter. If it enters, it pays 
a cost of F. At the second stage, firm A decides whether to bundle. At stage three, firms 
simultaneously set prices. We consider four situations: (1) independent pricing by 
monopolist A, (2) bundling by monopolist A, (3) competitive independent pricing, and 
(4) competitive bundling. 
Consumers should be uniformly located in a Hotelling unit square with firm A located 
at (0, 0) and firm B located at (1, 1). The horizontal interval represents product 1 and as 
a consumer located further away from firm A horizontally, she holds less taste 
preference towards firm A’s product 1 and more prefers to firm B’s product 1. The 
vertical interval represents product 2. Under an independent pricing scheme, a consumer 
located at (d1, d2) buying AB will get a surplus of 2C-λd1-λ (1-d2)-p1A-p2B, where λ is the 
strength parameter of differentiation. Similarly, the consumer purchasing only a single 
product will get a surplus C-λdm-pmj, m=1,2, j=A,B. When firm A bundles, the consumer 
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buying the bundle will earn a surplus 2C-λ (d1+d2)-pA, where pA is the bundle price. 
We denote the profit of firms A and B as πA(sA, sB), πB(sA, sB), respectively. sA∊SA = 
{N, B}, where N stands for independent pricing and B stands for bundling. In addition, 
sB∊SB = {0, 1}, where 0 means does not enter and 1 means enter. 
 
3-3. The equilibriums and results 
 
  We extend the model of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) by adding the single 
consumption. For simplicity of calculation, we set λ=1. We show the market 
configurations according to different levels of consumers’ reservation value (C) in 
figure 1. Concerning the situation where firm A bundles in a competitive market 
(situation 4), we demonstrate an example for the calculation in the situation where C ≤ 
0.55. The demand of AA on the horizontal and vertical axes are the same, and we denote 
demand as dmA, m = 1, 2, and 2C - dmA - pA ≥ 0 (i.e., dmA ≤ 2C - pA). Then, the area of the 
triangle is (2C - pA)2/2, and this is the demand for firm A. Therefore, profit is  
 
πA = pA (2C - pA)2/2. 
 
Maximizing firm A’s profit with respect to pA gives us maximized  
 
pA = 2C/3 
 
and  
πA = 16C3/27. 
 
  When 1≤C<1.5, the market of competitive independent pricing is an adjacent market. 
In an adjacent market, according to Matutes and Regibeau (1992, p.52, line36), “both 
firms set prices for their complete systems so as to leave consumers located at the 
common market boundary with exactly zero surplus.” The market boundary of AA and 
AB just touches. And the market boundary of A2 and B2 just touches. In market 2, A2, 
B2 are symmetric. Therefore, for the consumer (0, 1/2) located in the boundary,  
 
C – 1/2 - p2A =0 
 
And 
C - 1/2 - p2B=0 
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are satisfied.  
p2A= p2B= C - 1/2 
 
and  
π2A = (C - 1/2)/2. 
 
The profit in market one is still monopoly profit C2/4. Then the total profit is  
 
πA = (C - 1/2)/2+.C2/4. 
 
  When C≥2, all consumers can buy product 1 in the market of competitive 
independent pricing. Therefore firm A sets a price to ensure all consumers to buy 
product 1 thus  
 
C-1-p1A=0, 
and we have  
p1A= C-1, 
π1A= C-1. 
 
And we can find the demand for product 2 of each firm by finding the critical point 
(0,d2) where buying AA is indifferent with buying AB:  
 
2C- d2- p1A- p2A=2C- (1-d2)- p1A- p2B, 
 
then we have  
d2=( p2B- p2A+1)/2. 
 
Therefore, 
π2A= p2A (p2B- p2A+1)/2, 
π2B= p2B (1-(p2B- p2A+1)/2). 
 
Maximizing the profits with respect to p2A, p2B, we get  
 
p2A = p2B=1, 
π2A=1/2, 
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so  
πA = C-1/2. 
 
For more calculations, please refer to Appendix 2. 
 
Independent pricing selling by a monopolist A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (C<2)                    (C≥2) 
Bundling by a monopolist A 
 
 
 
 
 
     (C<0.75) (C≥0.75) 
 
(C<0.75) (C≥0.75) 
 
Competitive independent pricing 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
       (C<1)             (when 1≤C<1.5, adjacent market.         (C≥2) 
    when 1.5≤C<2, competitive market) 
 
AB 
 
A1 
AA A2 
B2 
AB 
 
AA A2 
B2 AB 
AA 
AA 
AA 
AA 
A1 
A2 AA 
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Competitive bundling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     (C<0.55) (0.55≤C<0.8)                (0.8≤C<1.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (1.3≤C<2)                       (C≥2) 
 
Figure 4. market configurations 
 
   
  We find if firm A monopolizes the market, when C<0.86, πA(N,0)>πA(B,0), otherwise 
πA(B,0)> πA(N,0). In addition, πA(N,1)> πA(B,1)always.  
  Therefore when C<0.86, firm A never uses bundling and firm A must enter the market 
on a certain range of entry costs.  
 
Table 2.  Firm A and Firm B’s profits when C=0.6 
Monopoly                  Entry  
 Independent pricing               0.18, 0                    0.18, 0.09-F 
  Bundling                      0.128, 0                   0.127, 0.089-F 
 
 
  We can easily see if F∊ (0, 0.09), firm B must enter the market. πA(B,0) <πA(N,1) in 
this case, therefore firm A has no incentive to bundle and deter entry. And we find that 
AA 
AA 
AA 
B2 
B2 
B2 
AA 
AA 
B2 B2 
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the profit of firm A has no change whatever the entry happens or not. This is because in 
this range of C, even entry has occurred, under independent pricing scheme, there is no 
competition.  
However, if C>0.86, firm A can use bundling to deter entry only if it commits to 
bundle. 
 
Table 3.  Firm A and Firm B’s profits when C=1.4 
Monopoly                  Entry  
 Independent pricing              0.98, 0                   0.94,   0.45-F 
  Bundling                      1.148, 0                  0.845, 0.245-F 
 
 
We can see if F∊ (0.245, 0.45), firm A can use bundling to deter entry only if it 
commits to bundling( in the game, stage1 and stage2 are in reverse order so that firm A 
can commit to bundle). In this case πA(B,0)>πA(N,1), firm A optimally engages in 
bundling to deter entry for a higher profit. This outcome and profit ranking are similar 
to the model by Whinston (1990). 
In a monopoly market, the bundle price is always lower than the total price of the 
two products under independent pricing. However, when consumers’ reservation value 
is small, consumers who cannot buy the bundle can buy single product under 
independent pricing. Independent pricing provides more selections and the demand 
under this situation is larger. Thus πA(N,0)>πA(B,0) when C<0.86. As consumers’ 
reservation value increases, more and more consumers can afford two products and the 
lower price of the bundle attracts more demands. Therefore bundling makes more 
profits. Then in a competitive market, the competition under bundling is more 
intensified thus harms firms’ profits. Independent pricing is preferred in a competitive 
market.  
 
3-4. Conclusions 
 
We sought to analyze the effect of bundling to deter entry by considering consumers’ 
reservation value and this makes the result differ from the previous research. In 
Whinston (1990), bundling deter entry only if the incumbent makes a prior commit. We 
show that when consumers’ reservation value is low, the incumbent even has no 
incentive to deter entry by using bundling because the profit if the entry happened under 
independent pricing is even higher than it in a monopoly bundling market. As 
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consumers’ reservation value increases, we find the outcome is similar to Whinston 
(1990). In reality, we can imagine that consumers obtain different level of value on 
different goods. If we consider a multiproduct firm’s products which are not that 
popular for consumers so that there are many consumers even do not want or just want 
one rather than both, we see that bundling cannot deter entry. If the products are very 
welcomed, bundling may deter entry only if the incumbent makes a prior commit. 
Therefore, we can see that by considering consumers’ reservation value in a two 
dimensional Hotelling model, bundling is not easy to happen because prior commitment 
to bundling is also difficult sometimes.    
 
Chapter 4. Bundling for entry deterrence and firm specific preference  
  
4-1. Introduction  
  
 Suppose a multiproduct incumbent monopolizes one market but faces a potential 
entrant in another market. Usually it is difficult to use bundling to deter entry for the 
multiproduct incumbent if the question is considered in a Hotelling model. For example, 
Whinston (1990) considered such a situation and, using a simple Hotelling model, 
argued that the incumbent could deter entry by bundling but only if it makes a prior 
commitment. Generally a prior commitment is not that credible. Nalebuff (2004) 
showed that in a modified two-dimensional Hotelling model, only if the incumbent 
chooses prices before the entrant。 
In our model, we assume consumers have “firm-specific preferences” or firms are 
differentiated, and we obtain that incumbent can deter entry by bundling without any 
commitment device, even if the incumbent and the entrant choose prices simultaneously. 
The result varies according to consumers’ reservation value. 
  According to Thanassoulis (2007, p.438, line 22), “firm-specific preferences capture 
situations in which the differentiation is at the firm level, between stores or shopping 
experiences, as opposed to at the independent product level. More formally, the taste 
compromise or transport/hassle cost associated with buying from a firm does not 
increase in proportion to the products being bought.” One example is the supermarket 
industry. A consumer incurs different transportation costs for different supermarkets. 
However, the cost does not increase in proportion to the number of goods bought in a 
specific store. 
Our study shows that the incumbent can deter and even block entry by bundling when 
consumers’ reservation value is at an intermediate or relatively high level. Therefore 
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bundling is more likely to happen if the products are very popular or the consumers’ 
reservation value is at a high level. This provides a more specific target to judge if 
bundling should be intervened.   
   The remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows. In section 2, the model is 
introduced. In section 3, we analyze equilibriums and results. In section 4, we present 
our conclusion. 
 
4-2. The model 
   
Suppose there are two products, products 1 and 2. Product 1 is only provided by firm A, 
while product 2 may also be provided by firm B. We assume the marginal cost of either 
product for both firms is zero. Consumers purchase at most one unit of each product. 
Therefore, consumers are able to select at most six consumption combinations if firm A 
does not bundle, namely AA, AB, A1, A2, B2, and purchasing nothing. AA means buying 
products 1 and 2 from firm A; AB means buying product 1 from firm A and product 2 
from firm B; and A1, A2, and B2 mean purchasing only a single product 1 from firm A, 
a single product 2 from firm A, and a single product 2 from firm B, respectively. A 
consumer purchasing one product will have a reservation value of C. Therefore, a 
consumer will have 2C if she purchases two products. Firm A has two strategies to 
select from, that is, pure bundling and independent pricing. We engage in a three-stage 
game. At the first stage, firm B decides whether to enter. If it enters, it pays a cost of F. 
At the second stage, firm A decides whether to bundle. At stage three, firms 
simultaneously set prices. We consider four situations: (1) independent pricing by 
monopolist A, (2) bundling by monopolist A, (3) competitive independent pricing, and 
(4) competitive bundling. 
Consumers are uniformly distributed along a Hotelling unit interval with length of 1. 
They have firm-specific preferences, meaning that the products sold are not 
differentiated but the firms themselves are differentiated. Firm A is located on the left 
corner, and firm B is located on the right corner. Suppose there is a consumer x located 
at a certain distance d away from firm A. For the case of independent pricing, consumer 
x purchasing one product from firm A (i.e., A1 or A2) will obtain a surplus of C - t × d - 
pmA, m = 1, 2, where pmA is the price of a certain product of firm A and t is the strength 
parameter of differentiation. If this consumer buys AB, she will obtain a surplus of 2C - 
t × 1 - p1A - p2B. This consumer is d away from firm A and 1 - d away from firm B. Thus, 
purchasing two products from two firms induces a cost t × 1. However, if she purchases 
AA, she will obtain a surplus of 2C - t1 × d - p1A - p2A, where t ≤ t1 ≤ 2t, meaning she 
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incurs a reduced cost owing to one-stop shopping. The reduced cost may stand for 
repeated contract cost, cost of collecting information, or transportation cost. For the case 
of pure bundling, consumer x purchasing the bundle from firm A will obtain a surplus of 
2C - t1 × d - pA, where pA is the bundle price. 
In the entry game, we denote the profit of firms A and B as πA(sA, sB), πB(sA, sB), 
respectively. sA∊SA = {N, B}, where I stands for independent pricing and B stands for 
bundling. In addition, sB∊SB = {0, 1}, where 0 means does not enter and 1 means enter. 
 
4-3. The equilibriums and results 
 
For simplicity of calculation, we set  
t = 1, 
t1 = 1.5.2 
 
We show the market configurations corresponding to different levels of consumers’ 
reservation value (C) in four situations in Figure 1. We use the consumer’s surplus to 
determine the market configurations. For example, in order to determine the demand for 
AA, we just find the area d where the surplus of buying AA (i.e., 2C - t1d - p1A - p2A) is 
higher than the surplus of buying all the other possible consumption selections under a 
certain level of C. Then, we can ascertain demand for the other selections at the same 
time and thus obtain the market configurations. This process is conducted using 
Mathematica software.  
In a monopoly market, we find that a consumer can always obtain a higher surplus by 
purchasing two products from firm A together (AA) because of the reduced cost of 
one-stop shopping, compared with purchasing a single product from firm A (A1, A2).3 
Therefore, in a monopoly market, consumers always purchase two products, and hence, 
the market configuration of independent pricing and bundling are the same. 
   
 
 
                                                  
2 If t ∊ [0, 1] and t ≤ t1 ≤ 2 are satisfied, the change of t, t1, only changes if the equilibriums occur in different ranges 
of C and there is no significant difference in outcomes.  
3 Suppose a consumer is located d away from firm A. The consumer will obtain a surplus of 2C - t1d - p1A - p2A if she 
buys AA. She will obtain a surplus of C - td - p1A if she buys a single product A1. (2C - t1d - p1A -p2A) - ( C – td - p1A)= 
C - (t - t1)d - p2A≥ C – td - p1A, for t ≤ t1 ≤2t, p1A = p2A. 
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(4 > C ≥ 1.27, competitive market)            (C ≥ 4, monopoly) 
 
 
 
4-3-1. Independent pricing and bundling by monopolist A 
 
4.3.1.1. C < 1.5 
Firm A serves all consumers such that 2C - 1.5 × d - p1A - p2A ≥ 0 under the case of 
independent pricing. The situation is the same under bundling for  
 
p1A + p2A = pA. 
 
Then, we have d ≤ 2(2C - pA)/3 and the profit of firm A is  
 
πA(N, 0) = πA(B, 0) = (4C - 2pA) pA/3. 
 
When maximizing firm A’s profit with respect to pA, we obtain  
 
πA(N, 0) = πA(B, 0)= 2C2/3. 
 
4.3.1.2. C ≥ 1.5 
Firm A serves all the consumers in the market. Therefore, firm A sets a price to ensure 
that all the consumers buy the bundle so that  
2C - 1.5 × 1 - pA = 0; 
then  
pA = 2C - 1.5, 
πA(N, 0) = πA(B, 0) = 2C - 1.5. 
 
4-3-2. Competitive independent pricing 
 
4.3.2.1. C ≤ 0.85 
Both firms A and B are local monopolists. Assume gA is the demand for AA and gB is 
the demand for B2. Therefore, 2C - 1.5 × gA - p1A - p2A ≥ 0, C - p2B - gB ≥ 0, p1A is equal 
to p2A, and hence, gA ≤ 2(2C - 2p1A)/3, gB ≤ C - p2B. Then, we have 
 
πA(N, 1) = 4p1A(2C - 2p1A)/3                                          (1) 
Figure 5. Market configurations 
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πB(N, 1) = (C - p2B)p2B                                                                      (2) 
 
We maximize profit with respect to p1A and p2B, respectively. We obtain the 
maximized results,  
 
p1A = p2A = p2B = C/2, 
gA = 2C/3, gB = C/2, 
and  
πA(N, 1) = 2C2/3, πB(N, 1) = C2/4. 
 
4.3.2.2. 0.85 < C < 1.16 
The market changes from a monopoly to an adjacent market. In an adjacent market, 
according to Matutes and Regibeau (1992, p.52, line 36), “both firms set prices for their 
complete systems so as to leave consumers located at the common market boundary 
with exactly zero surplus.” Therefore, in an adjacent market, the market boundary of AA 
and just touches that of B2 and do not change. The market configuration changes from a 
monopoly; hence, we have  
 
2C/3 + C/2 = 1, 
 
and then, we know the constant demand for firms A and B are  
 
gA = 2C/3 = 4/7 
and  
gB = C/2 = 3/7 
respectively. According to the definition of an adjacent market, the consumer on the 
common market boundary will have a zero surplus. Therefore, we have  
 
2C - p1A - p2A - 1.5 × gA = 0 
and  
C - p2B - gB = 0, 
and then, we have  
 
p1A = p2A = (2C - 6/7)/2, 
p2B = C - 3/7. 
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The profit of each firm is shown below: 
 
πA(N, 1) = 4(2C - 6/7)/7.                                           (3) 
 
πB(N, 1) = 3(C - 3/7)/7.                                            (4) 
 
4.3.2.3. 1.16 ≤ C < 2 
The market of product 2 is competitive. We can calculate the critical point g to be 
indifferent between buying AB and AA, where  
 
2C - p1A - p2A - 1.5 × g = 2C - p1A - p2B - 1, 
 
and we obtain  
g = (2 - 2p2A + 2p2B)/3; 
 
product 1 is not in this profit function. Then, we can calculate the profits from product 2 
for each firm as follows:  
 
π2A = (2 - 2p2A + 2p2B)p2A/3.                                         (5) 
 
π2B = (1 - (2 - 2p2A + 2p2B)/3)p2B.                                     (6) 
 
We maximize firm A’s profit with respect to p2A and firm B’s profit with respect to p2B, 
and we obtain  
p2A = 5/6, 
p2B = 2/3, 
π2A(N, 1) = 25/54, 
πB(N, 1) = 8/27. 
 
Then, we can calculate the critical point between buying AB and B2,  
 
2C - p1A - p2B - 1 = C - p2B - x, 
where x is the demand for B2. We obtain  
 
x = p1A + 1 - C. 
From the market configuration, we know the demand for firm A’s product 1 is  
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1 - x = C - p1A. 
 Then, the profit of firm A’s product 1 is  
 
π1A = (C - p1A)p1A                                                (7) 
 
Product 2 is not in this profit function. We maximize firm A’s profit with respect to p1A, 
and then, we obtain 
 
p1A = C/2 
and  
 
π1A (N, 1) = C2/4. 
The total profit of firm A is  
 
πA (N, 1) = 25/54 + C2/4. 
 
4.3.2.4. C ≥ 2 
All consumers can afford to buy A1, and therefore, firm A sets the highest price for 
product 1 to ensure that all consumers buy A1, so that  
C - p1A - 1 = 0, 
and then,  
p1A = C - 1, 
π1A(N, 1) = C - 1. 
 
The profit of firm A from product 2 and the profit of firm B do not change. Therefore, 
the total profit  
 
πA(N, 1) = 25/54 + C - 1. 
 
4-3-3. Competitive bundling 
 
When C < 1.27, the ways of calculating profits are the same as in the situation of 
independent pricing in a local monopoly and adjacent market. We consider the 
following cases when C ≥ 1.27. 
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4.3.3.1. 1.27 ≤ C < 2 
This is a competitive market. We can calculate the critical point g to be indifferent 
between buying AA and B2:  
 
2C - pA - 1.5 × g = 2C - p2B - (1 - g). 
 
By using a method similar to independent pricing, we obtain  
 
pA = (7 + 2C)/6, 
p2B = (4 - C)/3, 
πA (B, 1) = 49/90 + 14C/45 + 2C2/45, 
πB (B, 1) = (32 - 16C + 2C2)/45. 
 
4.3.3.2. C ≥ 4 
In this case, in order to compete with firm A, which has the advantage of one-stop 
shopping, firm B has to set its price low enough and close to zero. Therefore, in this 
case, firm B cannot enter the market if firm A bundles. In addition, all consumers buy 
two products and firm A sets its prices as a monopolist:  
pA = 2C - 1.5, 
πA = 2C - 1.5. 
 
4-3-4. Results 
 
We find that when 1.16 ≤ C ≤ 1.74, πA(B, 0) = πA(N, 0) and πA(B, 1) > πA(N, 1). Thus, 
bundling is a weakly dominant strategy for firm A. Therefore, in this range of C, if πB(B, 
1) < F < πB(N, 1), firm B’s entry is effectively blocked if firm A is allowed to bundle. If 
bundling is not allowed, firm B must enter. In addition, when C ≥ 4, bundling ensures 
that firm B cannot enter the market. We show two examples as follows: 
 
Table 4.  Firm A’s and Firm B’s profits when C = 1.6 
Monopoly                  Entry  
 Independent pricing               1.7, 0                  1.103,   0.296-F 
 Bundling                       1.7, 0                  1.156,   0.256-F 
 
 
We can easily see that when F∊(0.256, 0.296), firm B’s entry is effectively blocked if 
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firm A is allowed to bundle. However, if 1.74 < C < 4, firm A can use bundling to deter 
entry only if it makes a prior commitment to bundle. 
 
 
Table 5. Firm A’s and Firm B’s profits when C = 1.8 
Monopoly                  Entry  
 Independent pricing              2.1, 0                  1.27,   0.296-F 
 Bundling                       2.1, 0                 1.248,  0.215-F 
 
 
We can see that if F∊(0.215, 0.296), firm A can use bundling to deter entry only if it 
commits to bundling. In the game, stages 1 and 2 are in reverse order so that firm A can 
commit to bundle.4 In this case of πA(B, 0) > πA(N, 1), firm A optimally engages in 
bundling to deter entry for a higher profit. This outcome is similar to the result in 
Whinston (1990). 
 
Table 6. The entry deterrence effect according to consumers’ reservation value 
 
Entry deterrence effect 
 
Level of C       
 
Bundling has no effect 
 
C < 1.16 
 
Bundling blocks entry 
 
1.16 ≤ C ≤ 1.74 
C ≥ 4 
 
Bundling deters entry 
with commitment 
1.74 < C < 4 
 
 
4-4. Conclusion 
 
Our results show that when C is relatively small so that two firms do not directly 
compete, pure bundling and independent pricing are the same. Therefore, bundling has 
                                                  
4
 Prior commitment to bundling is difficult sometimes. Therefore, a possibility of failure to do this exists, and in such 
a case, entry still occurs. 
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no effect on entry deterrence in this situation. As C becomes bigger, bundling is 
preferred and it blocks entry. However, as C increases, the competition under bundling 
intensifies. Thus, independent pricing becomes more profitable. However, monopoly 
profit is always the biggest. Thus, firm A is willing to make a prior commitment to 
bundle and gains a monopoly profit. When C is high enough, all consumers are able to 
buy two products. If firm A bundles, in order to compete with firm A that has the 
advantage of one-stop shopping, firm B has to set its price low enough and close to zero. 
At this time, firm B is unable to enter the market. Bundling blocks entry again here and 
ensures firm A’s monopoly position. The reduced cost incurred by customers in 
one-stop shopping plays a significant role in these outcomes. Note that we discuss the 
effect of entry deterrence based on a certain range of entry cost. For the case where 
entry cost is very small, bundling never has any effect on deterring entry.  
We aim to show a case where bundling can deter entry. In reality, if consumers hold 
firm-specific preferences, bundling may be a strong tool to deter entry thus it should be 
considered to be intervened in this situation. In addition, its effectiveness varies 
according to consumers’ reservation value, therefore for the products which are very 
popular (consumers’ reservation value is very high), the monopoly is more willing to 
use bundling to deter entry. This point can be considered to judge the incentive to 
bundle for the monopoly to deter entry. 
 
 
Chapter 5. Summary 
 
  We sought to discuss bundling for price discrimination and product specific 
preference,  bundling for entry deterrence and product specific preference, bundling 
for entry deterrence and firm specific preference. We find in the first question, it shows 
that mixed bundling is the dominant strategy when consumers’ reservation value is 
relatively low; otherwise, firms choose independent pricing. In the second question, we 
find that when consumers’ reservation value is relatively high, we show that the 
incumbent has an incentive to use bundling to deter entry only if a prior commitment is 
applicable. However, when consumers’ reservation value is low, the multiproduct firm 
even has no incentive to use bundling and bundling has no effect on entry deterrence. In 
the third question, the incumbent can deter and even block entry by bundling when 
consumers’ reservation value is at an intermediate or relatively high level. This result 
holds even when the incumbent cannot commit itself to such bundling in advance. In a 
brief summary, bundling may happen in duopoly market under product specific 
 33
preference, based on non-complementary products. This is different from the previous 
work. In addition, bundling is more like to happen and deter entry under firm specific 
preference, compared with the case under product specific preference.  
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
  The derivations of “both engage in pure bundling” can be found in Matutes and 
Regibeau (1988), the fully served markets of “only firm A engages in mixed bundling” 
and the fully served market of “both engage in mixed bundling” can be found in 
Matutes and Regibeau (1992). Because there are a great number of market 
configurations and the ways of calculations are similar, we show two examples of how 
we derived the outcomes. For more calculations, please contact with me for the 
calculation paper. 
(1) When 1 ≤ C < 1.5, it is an adjacent market of NN in case 1, where the market 
boundary of AA and AB just touches, and the market boundary of AA and BA just 
touches. Since the market 1 is separated from market 2, therefore the market 
boundary of A1 and B1 just touches, A2 and B2 just touches. In an adjacent market, 
both firms set prices for their complete systems so as to leave consumers located at 
the common market boundary with exactly zero surplus. The markets of a certain 
product are symmetric, thus we have: 
 
C – 1/2 – p1A =0, 
C - 1/2 – p1B=0, 
C – 1/2 - p2A =0, 
C – 1/2 - p2B =0, 
so we have 
 
p1A= p1B= p2A = p2B =C - 1/2. 
πA = p1A/2+ p2A/2= C - 1/2, 
πB= p1B/2+ p2B/2= C - 1/2. 
 
(2) When 0.5 ≤ C < 1, we consider the market where only firm A engages in pure 
bundling in case 1. First, we can find the critical point where buying AA is 
indifferent from buying B2 for the consumer (0, g2):  
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2C- pA- g2=C- p2B-(1- g2), 
so  
 
g2= (C+ p2B +1- pA)/2. 
Similarly we can find other critical points located on the axis. In addition, we can find 
the line where AA is indifferent from B2, where  
 
2C- pA- g1- g2 =C-(1- g2) - p2B, 
so  
 
g1 = (1+C+ p2B- pA -2g2). 
 
g1, g2 stand for the consumers located on the line in the unit square horizontally and 
vertically, respectively. We find the demand for each firm by using the critical points 
and indifference lines. The first order conditions are:  
 
(A)      (-9C2-3 p1B 2-(1+ pA)2-4 p1B (3+ pA)+2C(5+6 p1B +3 pA))/4 
(B)       (-9C2-3 p2B 2-(1+ pA)2-4 p2B (3+ pA)+2C(5+6 p2B +3 pA))/4  
(C) (-2-10C2- p1B 2-2 p2B - p2B 2-8 pA -4 p2B pA -2 p1B (1+ pA)+2C(6+3 p1B +3 p2B +4 
pA))/4 
 
  The equations of (A) (B) and(C) can be solved by computer for several values of C. 
 
Appendix 2 
 
  Because there are a great number of market configurations and the ways of 
calculations are similar, we show one example of how we derived the outcomes. For 
more calculations, please contact with the author for the calculation paper. 
  When 0.8≤C<1.3, we consider a competitive bundling market. First, we can find the 
critical point where buying AA is indifferent from buying B2 for the consumer (0, g2):  
 
2C- pA- g2=C- p2B-(1- g2), 
so  
 
g2= (C+ p2B +1- pA)/2. 
Then we can find the line where AA is indifferent from B2, where  
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2C- pA- g1- g2 =C-(1- g2) - p2B, 
so  
g1= (1+C+ p2B- pA -2g2). 
 
g1, g2 stand for the consumers located on the line in the unit square horizontally and 
vertically, respectively. We find the demand for each firm by using the critical points 
and indifference lines. The first order conditions are:  
(A)    (-9C2-3 p2B 2-(1+ pA)2-4 p2B (3+ pA)+2C(5+6 p2B +3 pA))/4 
(B)    (-9C2- p2B 2-2 p2B (1+2 pA) +2C (7+3 p2B +6pA)-3(1+4 pA + pA 2))/4 
The equations of (A) and (B) can be solved by computer for several values of C. 
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